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The Creation of Modern Denmark –  
A Figurational Analysis 
Lars Bo Kaspersen ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Schaffung des modernen Dänemarks – Eine Figurationsanalyse«. 
This paper takes its point of departure from an observation made by Norbert 
Elias in his book The Germans. Many (smaller) European states were confronted 
by Germany in various wars and conflicts and states such as Denmark suffered 
defeats. Following from this, Elias poses the question as to how the Danish 
people came to terms with this reality-shock. This paper claims that the unin-
tended consequence of the Danish defeat was the development of a new na-
tional habitus with a strong and particular form of nationalism. This national-
ism not only tied the nation to the state but went much further by defining 
the nation as the people and the civil society. It became a deeply sedimented 
form of nationalism, which provided Denmark with a very strong social cohe-
sion. The central argument concerns this strong Danish habitus linked to this 
form of nationalism. This paper argues that this habitus has become more 
problematic during the last 30 years in the era of globalisation. The strong 
Danish habitus generates resistance towards immigration, acceptance of refu-
gees, the EU, and the internationalisation of education – just to mention some 
problematic areas. Consequently, Denmark, as a small open economy depending 
on multilateralism and internationalisation, has difficulties fully embracing 
globalisation. 
Keywords: Norbert Elias, Danish habitus, war, the development of the Danish 
welfare state, “anti-globalisation” sentiments. 
1. Introduction 
Other European states have suffered heavy defeats in recent centuries, which 
have not only reduced their territory but at the same time shaken their pride to 
its foundations and called into question their identity as people and as states. 
Denmark, Sweden, even France, are examples […] Denmark after the loss of 
Norway (1815) and Schleswig-Holstein (1864) – how did people on these oc-
casions come to terms with the reality-shock? 
In Denmark, besides the movement to restore the old, larger realm, there also 
gradually arose tendencies towards self-reflection. In accordance with the so-
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cial structure of the country, they were geared amongst other things towards 
integrating into the smaller state the mass of the peasant population, who had 
stood outside the established strata as a for the most part still poor and unedu-
cated class. Some Danes apparently recognized then that it was a social as 
well as national necessity to raise the living and educational standards of the 
people, thus giving a better chance of reducing the class gradient as well as of 
forming the consciousness of a common national destiny. Among other things, 
a network of rural people’s high schools served this effort to bring about a na-
tional renewal after the defeat. It contributed to raising the level of knowledge 
and thus at the same time the standards of production and of living of the Dan-
ish peasantry. The gradual flourishing of Denmark after the defeats, and per-
haps the survival of the country, certainly rested not least on this self-
reflection and the related reforms. But one would probably not go astray if one 
supposed that, among all those endeavours, the insight that the defence of a 
country depends to a large extent on the well-being and feeling of belonging 
of all strata and in particular of the younger generations also played a part. 
(Elias 2013, 413f.) 
This quotation is from the book Studies on the Germans by Norbert Elias. It 
came out in German in 1989 titled Studien über die Deutschen: Machtkämpfe 
und Habitusentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. It was published exactly 
50 years after his magnus opus and first book On the Process of Civilisation 
(2012 [1939]). However, 1989 was also the year when the communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe collapsed and the Cold War ended. Elias had already experi-
enced the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the 
divided Germany. Now a new political order was developing, but he did not 
live long enough to follow the state formation processes within a new reunified 
Germany in 1991 and Germany as the key European great power in the 21st 
century. Elias had been able to follow changing European figurations and how 
different figurational dynamics with constantly changing ratios of power pro-
vided new and shifting conditions of existence for the different states and so-
cieties in Europe. Different figurations meant different types of interdependen-
cies between states in the European figuration of states, but it also involved 
different interdependencies between state and population and between different 
social groups within the states. This “figurational gaze” was a distinct Eliasian 
quality and this “gaze” made him a superior sociologist. He was one of the very 
few 20th century sociologists who never fell into the “methodological national-
ist trap.” He always insisted on analysing all aspects of social life by combining 
an “inter-state” perspective with an “intra-state” perspective (Elias 2009, 40). 
Obviously, Elias was interested in the German state formation process and 
he returned to this topic many times during his life. He also insisted that the 
book (Studies on the Germans) was an exploratory, not a comprehensive, 
study. The German state formation processes were very difficult to grasp and, 
in particular, the Third Reich and the “breakdown of civilization” could seem 
to be incomprehensible. Of course, he had to dedicate hours of reflection to 
shining light on these problems. 
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Elias was far too sophisticated to regard the processes of German state for-
mation, including the disastrous Nazi regime, as a “German problem” only. 
Any particular political and social order was not to be understood as an out-
come of purposeful action. Particular states and political orders were the out-
come of planned and unplanned processes: some were located within the par-
ticular state and society in question, and others in the figuration of states (intra-
state processes – inter-state processes).  
We tend to think that the people who have existed within the territory we 
today call Denmark have been involved in the development of the country: in 
other words, they have built it and they are responsible for the successful Den-
mark we see today. Seen in a figurational perspective, however, human devel-
opment and state formation are much more complex processes. Thus, I shall 
make the claim that modern Denmark was not as such “created” by Danes 
(Kaspersen 2013). Denmark, as a territorial nation-state with a particular na-
tional habitus and, increasingly, with an extended set of welfare institutions 
developing gradually from the last three decades of the 19th century and 
throughout the 20th century, is an entity constituted, shaped, and formed in 
struggles with Prussia and the German Kaiserreich (and later Nazi Germany 
and then the USSR). The development of the German Empire had enormous 
consequences for Denmark because Prussia/Germany and Denmark were inter-
dependent at many different levels (see below), including being situated next to 
each other in the European figuration of states (or more precisely survival 
units) (Kaspersen and Gabriel 2008). The character of the interdependency 
between the two countries did change but it did not decrease during the 19th 
century. However, the power ratio shifted significantly in favour of Germany. 
Therefore, Denmark’s development reflected largely some of the important 
changes in Germany.  
This takes me to my second claim: the fact that Prussia went to war against 
Denmark in 1864 as a part of the German unification process generated a 
strong “we-feeling” and a new national habitus in Denmark (Korsgaard 2004). 
This “we-feeling” and habitus, I will suggest, became the hidden secret of 
Danish development from 1864 onwards. 
My last claim concerns how the “we-feeling” and national habitus are cop-
ing with an interdependent and internationalised world in the early 21st centu-
ry. I shall provide some examples that demonstrate how the particular “we-
feeling” which used to be the hidden “driving-force” of the wealthy, double-
democratic welfare Denmark, has become a major problem for the country.
1
 It 
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gave people the possibility to organise in voluntary associations, and thus Denmark devel-
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prevents it from fully embracing this internationalised world, which is the best 
possible condition of existence for a small open economy. Denmark has with 
zeal and eagerness supported any extension and strengthening of internationali-
sation, especially since the Second World War. But this has come to a halt. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, I will provide some insight in-
to the interdependency between Denmark and Prussia/the German Länder. 
Most often, we tend to forget how strong the ties are that we find between the 
two countries, among certain groups and classes, and between some influential 
and powerful people located in the two different territories. In the next section I 
will look at the European figuration of states from the 19th century to the pre-
sent and some changes which took place in the second half of that century. 
These developments and events led to the rise of the nation in many parts of the 
continent. In the Danish case, the development of the nation-state was well 
under way by the first part of the 19th century, but its character changed dra-
matically after the Danish defeat by Prussia in 1864. The following section will 
present and describe some of the elements of the national habitus that devel-
oped in reaction to the defeat and the emergence of the major German nation-
state south of the Danish border. Finally, I shall demonstrate how this habitus 
has worked as a major asset for Denmark for more than a century, but in recent 
years has turned out to be a constraining factor in the current phase of the glob-
al political economy. Like Elias, I want to stress that this is an explorative 
paper with the purpose of undertaking a preliminary examination of the emer-
gence, development, and change of the Danish national habitus after the defeat 
in 1864. Much more research is needed! 
2. Figurational Interdependency: Denmark and Germany 
However far back we move in historic time, we can find interaction between 
different social groups in the areas which now comprise the Danish-German 
border regions. Gradually, during the first millennium, some forms of political 
organisations and of a frontier region began to develop. Various fortifications 
dating back to the 6th or 7th centuries have been discovered and when social 
groups begin to organise defences against others, we can posit an us/them-
relationship (Kaspersen 2013). This, again, created “we-feelings” and distinct 
identities. Each group served the function of providing an identity for the 
neighbour. Various German survival units, including the Hanseatic League, 
developed strong economic ties to Denmark, and they played an important role 
for one another. Several times, they went to war – the first occasion being in 
                                                                                                                                
oped a strong democracy embedded in individual rights (liberal democracy), but stressing 
the voluntary and associational aspect. Individuals as well as collectivities had extended 
freedom. 
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the 13th century. Warfare between two parties bears witness to a strong inter-
dependence.  
This interdependence also showed itself in several other ways. Before the 
era of the nation-state, there were no clear linguistic and cultural lines of de-
marcation between Germany and Denmark. Thus, in Copenhagen in the 17th, 
18th, and 19th centuries, German was the language of the civil servants in the 
state administration, the language of the military, and even the language mostly 
used by craftsmen. During the 19th century, when the two major ideological 
movements – nationalism and liberalism – swept across the European conti-
nent, Denmark launched various initiatives to protect “Danishness” and began 
to nominate people for jobs who were Danish-speaking (Østergård 2015, 
125ff.).  
Denmark and Germany were also deeply politically intertwined. For many 
years the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein belonged, in part or complete-
ly, either to Denmark or Germany, or were virtually independent, but obviously 
interdependent between the two states. The exception is that Schleswig had 
never been part of Germany before the Second Schleswig War of 1864. For 
many centuries, the King of Denmark was both a Danish Duke of Schleswig 
and a German Duke of Holstein and the Duke of Saxony. Essentially, Schles-
wig had either been integrated into Denmark or had been a Danish fief, and 
Holstein had been a German fief and once, long ago, a sovereign state. Both 
were, for several centuries, ruled by the kings of Denmark. In 1721, all of 
Schleswig was united into a single duchy under the King of Denmark, and the 
great powers of Europe confirmed through an international treaty that all future 
kings of Denmark should automatically become dukes of Schleswig and that, 
consequently, Schleswig would always follow the same line of succession as 
the chosen ruler in the Kingdom of Denmark (Gregersen 1981). 
The German national awakening following the Napoleonic Wars led to a 
strong popular movement in Holstein and southern Schleswig for unification 
with a new Prussian-dominated Germany. However, this development was 
paralleled by an equally strong Danish national awakening in Denmark and 
Northern Schleswig. It called for the complete reintegration of Schleswig into 
the Kingdom of Denmark and demanded an end to discrimination against 
Danes in Schleswig. King Frederick VII of Denmark declared that he would 
grant Denmark a liberal constitution, and the immediate goal for the Danish 
national movement was to ensure that this constitution would not only give 
rights to all Danes, i.e., not only in the Kingdom of Denmark, but also to Danes 
(and Germans) living in Schleswig (Bjørn 1990). Furthermore, the Danes de-
manded protection for the Danish language in Schleswig, since the dominant 
language in almost a quarter of Schleswig had changed from Danish to German 
since the beginning of the 19th century. 
A liberal constitution for Holstein was not seriously considered in Copenha-
gen since it was a well-known fact that the political élite of Holstein had been 
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far more conservative than Copenhagen. This proved to be the case, as the 
politicians of Holstein demanded that the Constitution of Denmark should be 
scrapped – not only in Schleswig but also in Denmark. They also demanded 
that Schleswig immediately follow Holstein and become a member of the 
German Confederation, and eventually a part of the new united Germany. 
These demands were rejected, and in 1848, the Germans of Holstein and 
Southern Schleswig rebelled. This was the beginning of the First Schleswig 
War (1848-51), which ended in a Danish victory that was interpreted in Den-
mark as a victory for the new Danish nation-state (Korsgaard 2004, 342). As 
we shall see in the next section, a new “we-feeling” was consolidated with this 
victory – a new perception of being Danish, replacing the patriotism which had 
developed in the last two decades of the 18th century and the first decade of the 
19th century. 
3.  A New National Habitus 1815-1864: The Introduction 
of the Liberal Constitution and the Emergence of the 
National Liberal State (1848-49) 
After the Peace of Kiel of 1814, Denmark ceded control over Norway. At the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815, Denmark managed to preserve the Helstat 
(the composite state or unitary state) and Holstein remained Danish. Following 
these developments, Denmark had to adapt to a new territorial situation and 
embark on economic reconstruction. Politically, the first decades following the 
fall of Napoleon were a stable period for the country. As in the rest of Europe, 
there was a conservative reaction, which served to stabilise the absolute monar-
chy of King Frederik VI (Bjørn 1990, 107-29). 
As the economy grew stronger, and with it the liberal bourgeoisie, there 
were growing demands for economic and political liberalisation. Liberal ideas 
gained ground along with notions of national self-determination and the key 
role of the nation. A few years later, the spread of these European ideas would 
become important for the processes of political change that were to prove so 
fateful for Denmark. Initially, however, Denmark managed to preserve its 
sovereignty and its territory after the civil war in Schleswig-Holstein and the 
subsequent confrontation with Prussia in 1848-1849. One of the consequences 
of the war was the introduction of the liberal constitution in 1849 (Bjørn 1990, 
338-62). 
Nationalism and ideas about liberal democracy had already found their ad-
vocates in Denmark in the early 1830s. At the time, the country was experienc-
ing liberal trends and as a result, from May 1834 onwards, King Frederik VI, 
still an absolute monarch, had to establish consultative assemblies in the cities 
of Roskilde, Viborg, Schleswig, and Itzehoe. The demand for consultative 
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assemblies had first been raised in Holstein, which was a member of the Ger-
man Confederation. This demand spread, resulting in the four assemblies 
across the whole realm. This compliance with demands from national-liberal 
circles in the country resembled situations seen in several other European coun-
tries (Skovgaard-Petersen 1985, 39-42). However, it was not until 1848 that a 
major clash occurred. 
Prussia’s military support for Schleswig-Holstein threatened the integrity of 
the Danish state. The Danish King was forced to give in to internal pressures 
from the national-liberal groups that wanted a liberal-parliamentarian constitu-
tion
2
; otherwise, he would not have been able to introduce conscription and 
thus maintain an adequate military force. The King introduced general con-
scription, which helped prevent Prussia from overrunning Denmark and al-
lowed for Schleswig-Holstein to be forced into submission and the Helstat to 
be preserved. In return, the bourgeoisie and the new class of farmers gained the 
right to vote and stand in elections (Kaspersen 2004). 
What influence did the constitution have on the development of state and 
society in Denmark? When Danes claim that the constitution is the legal basis 
for the introduction of democracy in Denmark, as they tend to do, it is a truth 
with modifications. Formally, the governance of the country did pass from the 
monarch to the government and the Rigsdag (the newly established bicameral 
parliament), but in practice, this change represented a very modest expansion 
of democracy if we consider the number of men eligible to vote. It is more 
accurate to say that the constitution provided the legal foundation for the emer-
gence of a liberal society.  
The actualisation of a (civil) society, in the sense of a free sphere that is sep-
arate from the state and where citizens can pursue their own interests, including 
owning property and doing business, came about with the Constitution of June 
1849 and the Freedom of Trade Act of 1857. After this, on the one hand there 
was the state, a legal and political organisation that empowered the citizen who 
had rights and obligations and gave freedom to act in relation to family, socie-
ty, and state. On the other, there was society, a free sphere in which individual 
and collective actors (interest organisations and other voluntary associations) 
were now free to pursue their interests. The sphere of society included both the 
market (the buying and selling of property and products) and civil society (vol-
untary associations). 
The creation of the constitution can be seen as related to 1) a range of 
broader processes of Europeanisation, including ideological trends, shifts in the 
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  The national-liberals were mainly the intellectual elite and the rising bourgeoisie supported 
by the new and rising class of farmers. The intellectual élite used nationalism as an instru-
mentalist ideology to gain support for their constitutional proposal. Therefore, nationalism 
was mostly a top-down ideology. 
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balance of power among the states, and the emergence of a more confident 
national-liberal bourgeoisie; and 2) the war against Prussia of 1848-1849. 
The problems with the duchies and Prussia in 1848-1849 became a pivotal 
factor in the development of the Danish state. External sovereignty was main-
tained, but the conflict and war led to a reorganisation of the state, where inter-
nal sovereignty took on a different character. The absolute powers of the king 
were reduced. The liberal constitution placed the individual at the centre and 
the Freedom of Trade Act liberated the individual from the medieval guild 
structures (Skovgaard-Petersen 1985, 74-94; 218-49; Bjørn 1990, 338-46). The 
liberal constitution was based on the idea of the autonomy of the individual 
where the individual and individualism take centre-stage and promote the posi-
tion of the individual in the political process. At this time, political parties were 
not part of the system; rather, individuals voted for individuals to represent 
them in Parliament. 
The idea of individualised democracy did not survive long, however. From 
the late 1860s, the various political interests were already starting to become 
more organised and party formations were beginning to appear (Hvidt 1990, 
145-60; Rerup 1989, 163-77). This development towards specific interests 
became more and more organised, and this would later become a crucial fea-
ture in Danish political culture. 
4.  German Unification and Danish Defeat – 1864 and its 
Consequences 
Prussia and Chancellor Bismarck were the driving forces behind the unification 
of Germany; this process had a bloody course as it took three wars before the 
unified German state was established.  
The Danish government’s decision to incorporate Schleswig into the king-
dom in 1863 gave Bismarck the welcome opportunity to persuade Austria to 
declare war on Denmark together with Prussia, and Denmark suffered a humil-
iating defeat in 1864.
3
 It was a great shock to the Danes. Denmark was still one 
of the most militarised societies in Europe and in its self-perception, it was 
more than strong enough to defeat Prussia. This humiliating defeat undermined 
the we-image which grew out of the 1840s and 50s. 
This defeat led to profound soul-searching and several domestic policy con-
flicts in which an internal struggle for sovereignty was also a struggle over how 
to govern in a new Europe (Rerup 1989, 149-55; Korsgaard 2015a). One im-
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  To be more precise, it was not only a Prussian war. Austria held the leadership of the Ger-
man Federation that led, in 1864, to Habsburg troops bearing their (quite substantial) share 
of the war effort. 
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portant consequence of the defeat was the acknowledgement that Germany had 
risen to become a great power and was a serious threat to Danish sovereignty 
and independence. After 1864 Prussia/Germany emerged as Denmark’s princi-
pal enemy. This external threat led to conflicts and to the formation of alliances 
and initiatives internally in Denmark.  
The German issue had several implications, including a constitutional 
amendment and defence policy. Germany’s defeat of Denmark and the estab-
lishment of Germany as a great power led to a series of conflicts and debates 
about Danish defence during the last three or four decades of the 1800s. This 
issue was pivotal in the conflict between the Conservative Party (Højre; the 
conservatives, the landowners, officialdom, and the bourgeoisie) and the Liber-
al Party (Venstre; the farmers). The conflict between the two parties was inten-
sified by the revision of the constitution in 1866, which made it more conserva-
tive. One chamber of Parliament (Landstinget) was strengthened, which 
enabled the conservative forces to block legislative initiatives from the other 
chamber (Folketinget). The Conservative Party held a majority in the Land-
stinget, while liberal groups held a majority in the Folketinget. The farmers and 
other groups saw the changes to the constitution as a weakening of the demo-
cratic foundation. The gap between the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Party was a major problem. 
In the period of 1875-1894, the Conservative government, under Prime Min-
ister J.B.S. Estrup, outmanoeuvred the opposition. Although the opposition 
held a majority in the Folketinget, Estrup managed to sidetrack them complete-
ly by using a set of provisional laws that made it possible to pass the state 
budget, the Finance Act, without the approval of the Liberal Party. The first act 
was passed in 1877 and, during the period of these provisional laws, 1877-
1894, Estrup forced through the construction of a large fortification around 
Copenhagen (Tamm 1996). 
It is important to point out that the conflict between the government and the 
opposition never led to an actual paralysis of the country. Behind this conflict 
was a common project, which generated a certain consensus: the national pro-
ject (Hornemann Møller 1992, 62). Denmark’s defeat in 1864, the loss of the 
Danish-speaking North Schleswig, and a general fear of the new and powerful 
German state led to a new form of popular nationalism – one that, unlike in the 
period leading up to the establishment of the constitution, was not just an in-
strument wielded by the political élite to promote their own interests. The new 
nationalism helped build a broader ideological and military mobilisation, which 
also served to reproduce the underlying national consensus. The defeat had 
contributed to the emergence of a small homogenous country in which one saw 
a congruence between territory (disregarding the North Atlantic islands), lan-
guage, religion, history, and ethnicity (Korsgaard 2015a). This congruence 
supported the development of a strong “we-feeling” which became stronger 
and stronger from crisis to crisis (agricultural crisis in Europe in the 1880s, 
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World War One, the depression of the 1930s, the Second World War, and even 
during the Cold War). 
Everyday institutions, however, were characterised by a policy of obstruc-
tion from the Liberal Party, which was too divided internally to bring about 
actual system change. Therefore, the more moderate part of the Liberal Party 
began to cooperate and negotiate with the Conservative administration. In 
1891, they managed to pass a series of Social Acts of Parliament and, in 1894, 
the two parties reached an agreement that secured political stability. 
The Social Acts that were passed in 1891-1892 also marked the beginning 
of a new period in the history of the Danish state. For the first time, welfare 
expenses began to appear on the state budget. This budget symbolises the tran-
sition to the social state (Sozialstaat), the precursor of the welfare state. Unlike 
Bismarck, Estrup and the Danish government did not intend to fix the problems 
that plagued the working class. Instead, their ambition was to assist the old and 
the poor in the rural districts, who were left behind when the younger genera-
tions moved to the cities. The Danish system was voluntary, and social and old-
age benefits were available to anyone, including craftspeople and farm workers 
(Philip 1947). 
The basis of the system was not a state intervention into the labour contract 
but financial subsidies and legal support for voluntary associations in civil so-
ciety. This principle was called “helping people to help themselves” and ap-
plied to associations with members with an income equal to or less than a 
skilled worker. Thus, the associations for sickness insurance – the “sick-
clubs” – would be recognized by the state and subsidized only if their rules 
and number of qualified members met the standard. The same held true for as-
sociations for unemployment insurance, the “unemployment clubs”, even if 
they were organized and run by the trade unions. (Bernild 2003, 2) 
The above quote illustrates an important structural feature of the Danish wel-
fare state: that of assistance aimed at supplementing people’s own efforts – in 
other words, help to enable people to help themselves. A number of welfare 
provisions were created and managed by voluntary associations, including 
health insurance societies (sick-clubs) and the union insurance system. The 
state subsidised these associations but the programmes were organised and 
managed by the associations themselves. Arguably, this principle of organisa-
tion formed the basis of a welfare state that was to become more social-liberal 
than social-democratic in its basic structure. 
The character of the Danish state’s intervention strategy is remarkable. As 
mentioned above, it took the form of helping people to help themselves by 
supporting a series of initiatives, including voluntary associations such as sick-
clubs and the union insurance system. The state chose to negotiate with the 
opposition via the voluntary associations. In relation to the goal of the state 
élite on the one hand, and the relatively strong and organised opposition on the 
other (the farmers were increasingly organised, for example in cooperatives, 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  192 
“folk” high school associations, political parties, and gymnastics clubs), this 
strategy from the point of view of the state was the most plausible option.  
A power strategy which includes negotiation and recognition of other inter-
ests increases the power of the state as well as civil society, as it gives the state 
better options for implementing and anchoring its initiatives and decisions 
through civil society. The organisations, associations, and companies that make 
up civil society gain increased recognition from the state and this, in turn, im-
proves their ability to influence the state and the implementation process. This 
improves the legitimacy of state initiatives. 
5.  The Continuing Fear of Germany: External Threat and 
Internal Social Cohesion 
Throughout the second half of the 1800s and the first decade of the 1900s, the 
relationship between Denmark and Germany remained tense. In 1879, Prus-
sia/Germany had annexed all of Schleswig despite an agreement in the peace 
treaty of 1866 that the population of Northern Schleswig would be entitled to 
determine their own nationality in a referendum. During the 1890s and early 
1900s, when the European balance of power was shifting, not least as a result 
of the new Germany’s growing industrial and military prowess, Denmark came 
under increasing pressure. Despite a declared policy of neutrality, the Germans 
were not convinced that Denmark would remain neutral in a confrontation 
between the great powers. The Germans did not want to see their navy ham-
pered by Danish support for other powers, least of all Britain, in the event of 
war. Thus, Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, stated that 
Germany would “put an end to Denmark” if the country were to ally with Brit-
ain (Rerup 1989, 304). 
The threat from Denmark’s neighbour to the south was obvious, and this 
was a source of concern for Danish politicians. The government and most 
politicians were aware that an armed conflict with Germany was bound to 
result in defeat and misery. Peter Munch (1870-1948), the head of the new 
Social-Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre 1905), who later became Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, was a strong advocate for Denmark to avoid a military 
confrontation with Germany, in which defeat would be inevitable. Munch was 
convinced that a military confrontation with Germany would only cause Den-
mark to lose its sovereignty. According to him, therefore, Denmark should 
remain neutral and stay on the sidelines of any conflict between the great pow-
ers. 
The policy of neutrality was by no means new – it had been applied since 
1815 – but it now became a more prominent part of the government’s pro-
gramme. This was because the government now included the Danish Social-
Liberal Party and some minority governments could only muster a parliamen-
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tary majority with support from the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemo-
kratiet). The very explicit nature of the disarmament policy was new, however. 
Denmark had been one of Europe’s most heavily militarised states well into the 
second half of the 1800s, but in the first half of the 1900s in particular, demili-
tarisation really began to gain momentum. 
These new circumstances made Munch elaborate on an idea that stemmed 
from the national-liberal politician and, later, bishop D.G. Monrad (1822-1887) 
concerning the relationship between state and people (Karup Pedersen 1970, 
423). Munch argued that the state and the people do not make up a unified 
entity. The state might be exposed to serious threats – in fact, it might even 
disappear temporarily – but the people would nevertheless still be able to con-
tinue as a people. Therefore, Munch argued that the only viable strategy to 
ensure Denmark’s survival was to develop a people anchored in a strong na-
tional community and society – a people and a community that would with-
stand any external enemy. With reference to Poland and the fate of the Polish 
people, Munch argued that “the state may perish, but the people will endure”. If 
the people and the nation were to survive, however, there had to be a responsi-
ble government that was able to provide the necessary conditions for a strong 
national society and community to develop and thrive. The first prerequisite of 
this, according to Munch, was to reduce inequality and the substantial class 
differences in society: 
The state and the people are not one. If the unlikely misfortune of being sub-
jugated under a foreign state were to befall the Danish people, the people 
would nevertheless endure […] And the people’s life is stronger and more se-
cure the more developed its spiritual and material culture is, and the less there 
remains of the class boundaries that split and divide a people into contending 
camps with different mindsets. (Munch 1905, 55; author’s translation) 
The efforts to strengthen Danish culture, the Danish “we-feeling,” and Danish 
self-esteem are an important instrument in Danish defense and the survival of 
the Danish people. Munch wrote in 1907: 
However, it lies within our powers to ensure our existence as a people, as a 
nation. The means for achieving this lie in expanding our culture and building 
a feeling of fellowship in the Danish people by developing such conditions in 
society that people from all strata have a reason to embrace their country and 
their people with passionate devotion. Many have ridiculed the sentence, “It is 
with culture, not with weapons, that we shall defend ourselves.” This ridicule 
comes from people who have not grasped the meaning of this sentence. Of 
course, the meaning is not that the enemies will drop their arms out of respect 
for our culture. It goes without saying that no culture, however refined, can 
secure the continued existence of the state as a state. However, a free and pe-
culiar culture permeating all tiers of the people can ensure that the people’s 
national life will endure, even if the calamity should befall us that the state 
would be relegated to the will of foreign assailants claiming the brutal right of 
war and conquest. (Munch 1907, 107; author’s translation) 
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These statements demonstrate Munch’s understanding of the national and the 
international as closely linked aspects. Thus, to him, domestic policy was an 
important instrument in the struggle for Denmark’s survival. Munch also con-
sidered social cohesion and the “we-feeling” as important elements in the 
state’s struggle for survival. The goal was to safeguard Danish sovereignty, and 
the means were the development of internal cohesion and a strong “we-feeling” 
by establishing what we would now call welfare institutions. This is exactly 
what Elias points to in the quotation introducing this article. Among other 
things, this required a strong national healthcare system as well as institutions 
to ensure a minimum of social security in the form of pensions, poor relief, and 
housing. The endeavour should be “to achieve equal rights for all Danes, re-
gardless what walk of life they were born into, to provide satisfactory econom-
ic conditions for all and equal influence on the governance of Danish society. 
[This will promote] the equity within our society that is the only firm basis for 
a true feeling of fellowship” (Munch 1907-1908, 549). In other words, the 
strong “we-feeling” is the strongest defence. Munch further pointed to a num-
ber of important tasks, including expanding the job base and preventing large 
net emigration by improving business and job opportunities in Denmark. In 
particular, he recommended that land be parcelled out from the large estates 
and transferred to smallholders and small-scale farmers, as that would provide 
many families with an income and enable them to earn a decent living. This in 
turn would offer more young people a future in the rural districts and reduce 
migration. In other words, Munch saw state intervention as necessary for 
providing adequate welfare services to the Danish population. International 
trade should be strengthened, and there was also a major national task in “culti-
vating the lowest walks of life, involving them in the common culture” 
(Munch, 1907-1908, 549). General education and enlightenment, educational 
institutions, and science were key instruments for realising Munch’s vision.  
This political vision allowed the Social-Liberal Party to connect with the 
Social Democratic Party. This link later proved quite durable. After the First 
World War, the alliance between the two parties became pivotal for the ongo-
ing development of the welfare state throughout the 20th century. The first 
welfare policies and institutions were, in fact, established by Estrup and the 
Conservative Party with support from the Liberal Party. The ongoing expan-
sion and consolidation of the welfare state, however, must be attributed to the 
alliance between the Social Democratic Party and the Social-Liberal Party. But 
while the welfare society as such was a goal for the Social Democratic Party – 
providing cradle-to-grave security for the working class – to Munch and the 
Social-Liberal Party, welfare institutions were merely the means to an end. 
Munch in particular was more interested in the survival and development of the 
state and the people than in specific class interests. His goal was to secure the 
continued existence of an autonomous and sovereign Danish people.  
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5.  The Crucial Years: 1914-1919 
Peter Munch’s political vision was important, and so was the coalition between 
the Social Democratic Party and the Social-Liberal Party, which rested on a 
number of shared political ideas. Munch was far from the only politician or 
intellectual who viewed national unity and welfare services as necessities. This 
was a widely held view among the political élite. But a particular world-view 
does not necessarily produce a state and society characterised by stronger so-
cial cohesion or closer cooperation among the political parties, social organisa-
tions, and interest groups. In Denmark’s case, the willingness to listen to one’s 
opponents, to compromise, and to contribute to the development of a “consen-
sualist” culture was more a product of necessity than of the Danes being a 
particularly benevolent people with strong social sensibilities. Tough choices 
and compromises require some sort of urgency or exception situation to pro-
vide the push towards solutions. The severity of the situation must be evident to 
the entire population before everyone is prepared to yield and accept that their 
own special interests do not take priority. This awareness emerged in Denmark 
in the years after its military defeat in 1864. The same was the case in connec-
tion with the agricultural crisis in the 1870s and 1880s and during the First 
World War. 
As far as the First World War is concerned, it made no difference that Den-
mark maintained a neutral stance. As soon as the war broke out it was clear that 
the country was going to feel the constraints and pressures of the conflict along 
with everybody else. Danish exports were threatened by embargos and, because 
some shipping lanes were mined, the same constraints applied to the import of 
raw materials. The resulting shortages of raw materials and commodities in 
turn led to price increases, which were a particular burden to low-income 
groups. This development had the potential to lead to growing inequality and 
social tension. Therefore, the state and the government adopted a new strategy 
to address the problems: massive state intervention and regulation. This inter-
vention, however, was based on a corporative structure with negotiations that 
involved key organisations in society representing the main population groups 
and economic interests (Vigen 1950, 440-69). 
On 7 August 1914, just after the outbreak of the war, the Danish govern-
ment, with unanimous support from Parliament, formed the Extraordinary 
Commission (Den Overordentlige Kommission) headed by Minister of Interior 
Affairs, Ove Rode. The strong support for the Commission indicated that the 
otherwise conflicting parties in Parliament had called a truce. Rode appointed 
representatives from all the major organisations, interest groups, and social 
classes in Denmark. Farmers, smallholders, industrialists, trade unions, ship 
owners, consumers, social democrats, liberals, and scientists were all repre-
sented (Vigen 1950, 444; Rasmussen 1965, 72). The Act of 7 August gave the 
minister and the Commission wide powers to intervene in, regulate, and control 
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affairs in society. The Commission established a regulatory system with far-
reaching effects on all economic and social aspects, including pricing policy, 
supply policy, a comprehensive rationing system, and, to some extent, an in-
come distribution policy. 
As pointed out above, the state had already begun to intervene in society in 
1891, and in the following years a number of Acts were passed that illustrated 
that it was no longer the “good old” liberal state, refraining from any form of 
intervention in the affairs of the family, market, and voluntary associations 
(Rasmussen 1965, 87). It was not until the First World War, however, that state 
intervention in society began to take place on such a large scale. The Extraor-
dinary Commission carried out this extensive intervention, in most cases with 
considerable success. Denmark made it through the war without major injuries, 
tensions, or social conflicts. 
It is important to understand the role that the First World War played in the 
process of state formation and societal development in Denmark. The state 
attempted to regulate society in pursuit of the common good and in an effort to 
accommodate all social classes. This was the first large-scale redistribution of 
income and welfare in Danish history. Crucial to this development were the 
means that the government and Parliament used to ensure support for a range 
of policy measures. Other states in Europe carried out similar state interven-
tions, but in Denmark these measures were based on a highly corporative strat-
egy, that is, the state negotiating with the organised interest groups. The state 
increased its powers, but so did many organisations representing the economic 
interests in society. By 1899, the state had already acknowledged and approved 
that the labour market was controlled and regulated by employers and employ-
ees. A few years earlier, the state had also accepted the presence and im-
portance of other organisations representing the farmers, industry, and others. It 
was not until the First World War, however, that all these organisations and 
interest groups were offered a seat in commissions and committees established 
by the government or state institutions. That gave them considerable influence, 
and their participation in the political processes transformed these organisations 
into more stable and institutionalised entities. They became indispensable and 
jointly responsible for societal development in Denmark.  
Thus, the First World War became a turning point for the political consen-
sualism that was to characterise the political culture in Denmark for the rest of 
the 20th century. A consensualist political culture does not mean consensus or 
the absence of conflict. Rather, it suggests the presence of a political culture 
with widespread consensus among the competing parties about the premises for 
the unfolding of conflicts. In other words, certain institutions and procedures 
were established, not least during the First World War, that would provide a 
framework and an agreed set of rules for managing conflicts. 
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7.  The Post-1864 Habitus and the Third Reich 
As previously described, the events of 1864 led to an enduring mistrust of the 
unified Germany. The annexation of Schleswig by the Kaiserreich, the quest 
for colonies in Africa, the First World War, and the rise of the Nazi Party were 
developments leading to even more mistrust, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty for 
Denmark. This long chain of events reinforced the strong social cohesion as a 
central aspect of the Danish habitus. Denmark survived the First World War by 
declaring neutrality and by reorganising the relationship between state and 
society. Cooperation between classes and civil society groups brought the 
country through the crisis and it remained a sovereign state. When Hitler seized 
power, Denmark faced a new situation. The big neighbour was no longer a 
democratic country, but was moving towards totalitarianism. How did the 
Danes react to the rise of the Third Reich and the Second World War? 
A strong element of the Danish national habitus was a willingness to solve 
problems by being pragmatic and inclusive. This happened after the 1864 de-
feat and during the First World War. The Danish parliament, government, state 
administration, and the majority of the population took the same attitude to-
wards the new situation in Germany and later towards the German occupation. 
The vast majority of the population remained sensible and supported the cen-
tre-left and the centre-right, and only a small percentage supported the far right 
or the far-left. The clear goal was survival.  
When the former party leader and Foreign Minister Peter Munch warned 
against the Kaiserreich in the first decade of the 20th century, he almost pre-
dicted that Denmark would disappear (temporarily) as a sovereign state due to 
Germany’s expansion. However, as an outcome of intended and unintended 
processes, the Danish habitus continued to develop social cohesion, a strong 
societal nationalism, strong welfare institutions supported by the state, and a 
problem-solving political culture embedded in political consensualism. These 
habitus components became reinforced during the German occupation and led 
to the survival of the Danish people. When Germany was defeated in 1945, the 
Danish people were able to have their state back.  
When Germany occupied Denmark on 9 April 1940, Denmark did not sur-
render. In a response to the German message about occupation, the Danish 
King replied that Denmark accepted the new conditions but he did not mention 
a surrender. Thus, the King and the government remained in power. There was 
a government reshuffle and all parties shared responsibilities. The state admin-
istration, the legal system, and judges continued to function and interest organi-
sations were asked to take part in governing the country. In many respects, the 
governing “model” developed during the First World War was repeated. 
The result was a constant negotiation policy between the Danish govern-
ment and the Germans in charge of Denmark. Germany wanted resources and 
this led to tough negotiations. In addition, Hitler wanted political support and 
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consequently, it became more and more unacceptable for the majority of the 
Danish population to support the government. In 1943, the Danish government 
stepped back and the Germans took over, although the Danish state administra-
tion continued to function. The particular form of nationalism developing after 
1864 and strong anti-Nazi German sentiments was a part of a habitus, which 
accepted the cooperation policy with the Germans as long as this policy had 
more advantages than disadvantages. Eventually, this post-1864 habitus had to 
react and a big nationwide strike in August 1943 forced the government to step 
back and the only legitimate government was the “Council of Liberty” consist-
ing of prominent members of the Danish resistance movements. After the gov-
ernment had gone, no one could hold back the resistance movement intensify-
ing its struggle against the Germans (Christensen et al. 2006). 
8.  1864 and the Strong “We-Feeling”  
When we analyse and discuss the development of the Danish national habitus 
and the particular we-identity related to this habitus, it is important to under-
stand how exceptionally strong the ideological mobilisation became in the 
aftermath of the 1864 defeat. The development of political consensualism, the 
emergence and consolidation of the people organising and being organised in 
many different “interest organisations,” the development of welfare institutions 
as an outcome of bottom-up and top-down processes, a dual democracy (based 
upon a liberal democratic constitution and an associative democracy), and a 
congruence between national identity, territory, language, and the political-
administrative institutions – all these components contributed to an exception-
ally strong, encompassing “we-feeling” (Korsgaard 2015a). The Danish nation-
al habitus and the Danish we-identity developed in and through a large number 
of institutions and institutional practices. These institutions are the means to 
and the outcome of the practices many different actors are exercising and con-
ducting all the time. These institutions become, in this context, ideological 
institutions, which contribute to the dissemination and consolidation of some 
specific ideologies. A number of voluntary associations within many parts of 
society were important. For example, many voluntary associations within sport, 
gymnastics, rifle shooting, evening schools, but also people’s “high schools,” 
the local parish churches, and cooperatives (grocery stores, farmers coopera-
tives, etc.). From the late 19th century onwards, trade unions, and employers’ 
associations played a particularly strong role in generating the we-identity 
(Kaspersen and Ottesen 2001).  
Some institutions and institutional practices are intertwined, producing and 
reproducing the national habitus and the particular distinct Danish we-identity. 
The Danish habitus developing in the post-1864 years was distinctive in many 
respects. In the years immediately after the defeat, Denmark was divided as 
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well as unified. The defeat created a situation in which the population of the 
country was split into several groups with different opinions about the future 
strategy of Denmark. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify two different 
positions, which both provide a potential future strategy for the country. The 
most powerful group within the figuration of actors fighting for the survival of 
Denmark was the conservative establishment consisting of the landed estate, 
the highest-ranking civil servants, and the wealthiest capitalists in the cities. 
They managed to push through a revision of the liberal constitution in 1866 
limiting some democratic elements. Moreover, in the Rigsdag (Parliament) 
they managed to outmanoeuvre their main enemy – the large oppositional 
group consisting of a heterogenous number of parties unified by liberalism and 
advocating the interests of the farmers and the peasant population. These two 
groups of society were in conflict about the constitution until 1901, when the 
“Left” succeeded in reintroducing and even extending the democratic constitu-
tional rights (Rerup 1989, 149).  
The constitutional conflict between the two groups ran parallel with other 
sets of disagreements. Thus, the two parties had very different views on how to 
solve the “Social Question” (i.e., how to help the increasing number of poor 
and old people in the countryside). Another conflict took place concerning the 
future defence of the country. With the emergence of a militaristic and nation-
alistic German Empire, Denmark’s geopolitical situation changed completely. 
Unlike the Left, the Conservatives wanted a new fortification protecting Co-
penhagen. Consequently, Denmark was struggling with internal conflicts at the 
same time as it was facing a new and strong enemy. What is significant about 
these internal conflicts and tensions is first and foremost that they never took 
the country into a major open crisis which Germany could have exploited. 
Despite the internal tensions, the defeat had generated a particular form of 
Danish nationalism which unified the whole country even with the many disa-
greements (Rerup 1989, 204). 
It is also important to note that in the second half of the 19th century, in par-
ticular from 1864, a number of old and new institutions contributed to the dis-
semination and “interpellation” of a particular version of Danish nationalism 
which went deep into the Danish soul, but also that this form of nationalism 
and the many institutions developed a particular form of “political consensua-
lism” which included certain ways to “solve” the conflicts. 
In order to pinpoint the Danish “we-identity” we have to operate with a dis-
tinction between state nationalism and people’s nationalism or, to put it differ-
ently, nationalism from the top and nationalism from below. The state is linked 
to the nationalism which is introduced from the top of the country: intellectuals 
and the state élite use nationalism as an instrument to mobilise the country 
behind their aims. Nationalism from below is symbolically linked to civil so-
ciety and it is disseminated through civil society institutions. When Denmark 
was defeated in 1864, the leading civil servants and urban intellectuals who 
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were involved in the introduction of the 1849 Constitution were made respon-
sible for the defeat. They had developed a “state nationalism” and had cynical-
ly been able to use a top-down strategy in order to exploit nationalism as an 
instrument to achieve their own goals. This was replaced by a strong popular 
nationalism penetrating the whole country from below. The “People” were 
linked to civil society – not to the state. Civil society was perceived as the core 
of the nation. The state was still legitimate because it provided a structure and 
frame of the free market, spiritually as well economically (Korsgaard 2004, 
342-43). Unlike in Germany, the connection between political power and the 
academic élite broke down in Denmark due to the events which led to the 1864 
defeat. While the German academic élite reinforced the effort to legitimise the 
state as the core of the German nation, the Danish academics lost their legiti-
macy as the class in charge of the state (Korsgaard 2004, 344). 
One of the important implications of the fall of the academic élite was a lack 
of willingness from the “People” to learn from the élite and the universities and 
to accept the “Bildung” (Education) proposed by the élite. Some alternative 
ideals of Bildung developed, inspired by the priest N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-
1872) (Korsgaard 2015a). Enlightenment and Bildung had to come from the 
“People” itself (Korsgaard 2004, 345; 2015b). Already before 1864 a number 
of People’s high schools had been created. These were not high schools in the 
traditional sense. They were schools open for everybody to learn, develop and 
mature. There were no exams and they were not traditional academic schools. 
The teachers were recruited from practitioners as well as the “popular élite” in 
the countryside. The students were 18 years or older and, besides some ordi-
nary school subjects, were taught Danish history, culture, and traditions. Music, 
singing and gymnastics were a part of the daily curriculum. It was also the 
place where the young generation could discuss new technologies and methods 
within agriculture. After 1864, the number of these schools increased and, 
together with many other new educational activities, Denmark rearmed in 
terms of “the enlightenment of the people” by the people and for the people. 
The goal was to educate the young generation without pushing them into a new 
class. In other words, these People’s high schools increased the knowledge and 
the spirit among the farmers – and they remained farmers the rest of their lives. 
The working class later repeated this when they started to organise and estab-
lish evening schools and People’s high schools for the working class. These 
bottom-up initiatives provided a strong educational foundation for the whole 
population and contributed to a rising self-consciousness and self-confidence 
(Korsgaard 2015b).  
The development of these many bottom-up initiatives later supported by the 
state turned Denmark into a kind of dual democracy. The people were allocated 
rights and citizenship as individuals in the Constitution, and these were sup-
plemented with democratic associational power. These democratic structures 
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were a part of the Danish identity and it was proudly celebrated and became a 
part of the “we-identity.” 
This does not mean that Denmark was a conflict-free society. On the contra-
ry, many different interests and different classes were fighting every day. The 
major difference between Denmark and some other countries when it came to 
disagreements was 1) procedures for conflicts and 2) solutions for big conflicts. 
I have previously mentioned the term “political consensualism.” This term is an 
attempt to describe a set of practices which followed (formal and informal) 
rules and gradually over the years developed into procedures for conflict reso-
lution. The different interest groups in conflict accepted that if the disagree-
ment deepened, they would follow certain procedures which eventually could 
stop the conflict. The best example here is the labour market. If an agreement 
could not be finalised and the conflict seemed to be continuing with major 
negative impacts on society, then in the last instance the two parties had to 
accept that the state would intervene and turn a proposal into law. However, 
none of the parties, including the state, liked such a solution. The second aspect 
– conflict solutions – was also a result of learning processes, the increasing 
strong “we-identity,” and the fact that Denmark is a small country. A certain 
practice developed gradually after 1864. When the Danish state and/or the 
Danish nation and people were facing a major crisis such as the 1864 defeat, 
the agricultural crisis in the 1880s, the First World War, the economic crisis in 
the 1930s, and World War Two, a crisis practice developed (Vigen 1950). As I 
demonstrated above, the practice was consolidated during the First World War 
(Kaspersen 2006). Denmark was facing a challenge and consequently, the 
government called for cooperation between all political parties and interest 
groups in the country. All the parties and interest groups had to learn to com-
promise and the strength of the political compromise was dependent on a “we-
identity” which was in turn dependent on a decision that served the interests of 
the people. 
9. The Danish National Habitus and the “We-Identity” 
Today – A Challenge? 
The Danish habitus and the “we-identity” which developed as a reaction to the 
1864 defeat proved to be an asset for Denmark throughout most of the 20th 
century. The ability to handle major crises, meet new challenges, and make 
decisions which the majority of the population find legitimate and acceptable 
have become a part of the Danish habitus. As often happens, it also becomes a 
story Danes love to hear and thus they tend to forget when things turn out dif-
ferently. However, we can find many examples which have followed the pat-
tern described in this paper. In other words, it is not a myth, although in recent 
years some of the patterns have changed.  
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Obviously, a national habitus is not a fixed essence. Culture and ideology 
are partly to be found in the shape of material objects, and partly they are a set 
of practices, so they are bound to change. Consequently, they are always in a 
certain sense “hybrids” since they constantly change by adopting new elements 
of other cultural practices. Thus, the Danish national habitus has also changed 
since 1864. Incremental as well as more radical changes can be detected during 
this long time span. There seems, however, to be some aspects of the Danish 
national habitus which still exist in the 21st century, and these turn out to be 
more of an obstacle for Denmark than the crisis-solving entity they used to 
constitute. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into any detailed analysis 
about which elements of the Danish national habitus limit the country’s poten-
tial in a globalised world. In the following I shall just mention two important 
examples: the EU and immigration. 
The development of the EU has always been a challenge to Denmark. Argu-
ably, the establishment of the EU served the purpose of linking Germany and 
France together in order to avoid war in Europe. Denmark has never really 
perceived the EU as a peace project. It assumed that the EU was an economic 
project with the purpose of intensifying trade and economic integration. For a 
number of years, Denmark was reluctant to join the EU because membership 
could be seen as a transfer of parts of the people’s sovereignty. Eventually, it 
joined at the same time as the United Kingdom in 1973. Denmark had to follow 
Britain because Britain was its most important trading partner. The reluctant 
and ambiguous attitude to the EU continued and, surprisingly to the EU, the 
Danish people voted against the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. This no-vote was 
difficult to explain because Denmark seemed to be one of the countries which 
could benefit most from the new treaty. Europe was taken by surprise.  
Why would a stable EU country such as Denmark vote against the progress 
of the European Community? In Denmark, a referendum was held and during 
the whole campaign all opinion polls predicted a victory for “Yes” to the Maas-
tricht Treaty. The biggest parties and centre-right, as well as the centre-left, 
recommended a “Yes” vote, but it became a “No.” To provide a comprehensive 
explanation for the outcome of the referendum is not possible, but a part of 
these processes was related to the Danish national habitus. To make my claim 
simple but clear: the vote-No parties turned out to be a modern version of the 
strong movements which, approximately a century ago, generated the particular 
Danish national habitus in the aftermath of the 1864 defeat.
4
 The people and 
the nation in civil society had re-emerged. This strong popular nationalism had 
been reproduced in the postwar years alongside a new strong commitment to 
“internationalisation.” In the first decades after 1945, the Danish habitus 
adapted to the new “world order” in which the Danish nation-state reinforced 
                                                             
4
  It is important to mention that not all no-voters can be categorised as representing the 
Danish national habitus anno 1875. 
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itself and maybe even peaked. The Danish welfare state was for Danish citizens 
and nobody questioned this assumption. From 1945 to the 1980s, in terms of 
language, ethnicity, history, and religion, Denmark was one of the most ho-
mogenous nation-states in the world, but embedded in a particular kind of 
nationalism. At the same time, the country supported all attempts to build a 
strong and open international society. This was not seen as a contradiction. On 
the contrary, the open international world and a world market was viewed as a 
precondition of the nation-state. The Danish post-1864 habitus had changed 
and adopted a version of “internationalisation.” The “national” was seen as 
interdependent with the commitment to the “international” society. The politi-
cal consensualist culture contributed to this development of the habitus. The 
four dominant political parties found it necessary to argue for strong support to 
build a genuine international society based upon international organisations in 
order to link the states together and create a set of international law which 
could prevent conflicts and facilitate “a free, open world.” Besides building 
international laws, rules, and institutions to avoid conflicts, Denmark supported 
all attempts to create an open world market based upon liberal values. Such a 
strategy was important to a small open economy such as the Danish. Open 
access to markets and peace and stability were crucial and, therefore, the re-
sponsible Danish politicians decided to pursue internationalisation as a strate-
gy. This went well until the 1990s. Mobilisation against the closer political 
integration of the EU was just the first sign that a problem was emerging. 
When various forms of EU law put pressure on the Danish “model,” more and 
more politicians turned to a form of EU scepticism. When Danes gradually 
realised that the Danish way of running the labour market was under threat, 
some resistance to the EU occurred. The habitus contains an element of nation-
al pride about Danish solutions and Danish institutions and often an unintended 
outcome of EU integration is an EU challenge to Danish practices and institu-
tions. Another example concerns how EU law prohibits the member states from 
providing special conditions for their citizens. Thus, Denmark is not allowed to 
provide education without tuition fees for Danish citizens only. They have to 
provide equal access under the same conditions for all EU citizens. This is 
another example of how the EU either pushes Denmark into the same rules and 
structures as most other member states have adopted, or Denmark sticks to its 
own policies including paying for the education for other EU citizens.  
Another issue exploded in the mid-1990s: the challenge from refugees, asy-
lum seekers and labour migrants. From the 1960s onwards, guest workers came 
to Denmark and they stayed in the country. They subsequently unified with 
their families and in the 1980s, refugees came from Palestine and the Iraq-Iran 
war. In the 1990s, refugees mainly came from the former Yugoslavia and most 
recently from Syria. Moreover, migrant workers from the former eastern Euro-
pean countries came to Denmark to work as a consequence of free mobility 
within EU. This has caused severe problems for Denmark (as well as other 
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countries) because it turned out that some of the Danish population did not 
share the view that labour migrants from the EU were to the benefit of Den-
mark. Moreover, they did not welcome the increasingly “multi-cultural” socie-
ty, especially not the group of people with an Islamic background. As the years 
have passed, even the established parties have accepted discrimination in social 
rights or a still tougher stance against refugees and immigrants. The once ex-
treme right-wing xenophobic party, the Danish People’s Party, has today been 
accepted as an established centre-right party. Some parties are even suggesting 
that we must work for a change in international law because these laws are too 
constraining on domestic politics (i.e., we are “forced to take in refugees”). 
Another implication of the reawakening of the popular nationalist national 
habitus has been a gradual change in legislation, which accepts some degree of 
discrimination between the inhabitants of Denmark. Certain social provisions 
are now dependent on a number of different criteria which in principle mean 
that equality in law is no longer the case. Also, in an attempt to fight gangs and 
other criminal groups, the character and size of sanctions used by the state 
depend on the police district dealing with the offenders. The famous universal-
istic welfare state – a child of the First and Second World Wars – and the rule 
of law are under pressure! 
10.  Conclusion 
This explorative paper claims that the national habitus changed in 19th century 
Denmark from a top-down élite project to introduce the liberal democratic 
constitution to a bottom-up popular type of nationalism embedded in civil 
society as a reaction to the Danish defeat to Germany/Prussia in 1864. 
I have tried to substantiate this claim by showing how this national habitus 
developed from the last decades of the 19th century up until the 1990s, and I 
have pinpointed some of the most important features of this habitus such as 
political consensualism, a strongly organised society in which the organised 
interest groups negotiate with the state about solutions to crises, and a distinc-
tive welfare state based upon bottom-up initiatives supported by the state.  
A second claim in the paper is that Denmark has benefitted from this habitus 
because, as a small open economy, the country was very vulnerable when new 
crises or challenges occurred. A strong social cohesion, an ability to act swiftly, 
and a set of institutionalised practices to provide political compromises and 
decisions have contributed to the survival of the country. These components 
have been unified in a particular Danish national habitus with a particular na-
tional identity and national pride identifying the nation with the people in (civ-
il) society. 
In the last 30-40 years, and especially after the end of the Cold War, the 
world has become more interdependent and this has led to many reactions from 
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local, regional, or national groups who feel insecure or more uncertainty con-
cerning identity. My third claim is related to the rise again of the post-1864 
habitus, which in recent years emerges as friction and therefore makes it more 
difficult to exploit the advantages of the EU and the world market based upon 
multilateralism. 
The rapid turnaround from being the front-runners in an increasingly inter-
dependent world to becoming neo-nationalistic and hesitant signifies how a 
deeply ingrained national habitus is coming back, although in a new version. 
However, it is mobilised by societal forces – and not by the political élite. 
Paradoxically, now the class of conservative civil servants, academics, intel-
lectuals, and the “business class” seems to be that part of Denmark which is 
most embracing globalisation and taking up the challenge from a changing new 
world. Again, this class is criticised for the “opening of the borders,” creating 
“the multi-cultural society,” and embracing globalisation. 
In the long run, Denmark cannot embrace and exploit globalisation and, at 
the same, withdraw from the world around us. In other words, the Danish fairy-
tale might not have a happy ending, but time will tell... 
References 
Bernild, Ole. 2003. On the Development of the Welfare State: The case of Denmark. 
Paper Presented at the 1st International Conference on Health, Humanity and 
Culture, October, Los Angeles, USA. 
Bjørn, Claus. 1990. Fra reaktion til grundlov. Gyldendal og Politikens 
Danmarkshistorie. Copenhagen: Gyldendal/Politiken. 
Christiensen, Claus B., Joachim Lund, Niels Wium Olesen, and Jakob Sørensen. 
2006. Danmark besat. Copenhagen: Høst & Søn. 
Elias, Norbert. 1978. What is Sociology? New York: Columbia University Press. 
Elias, Norbert. 2006. Early Writings. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.  
Elias, Norbert. 2009. On Sociology and Humanities (Essays III), vol. 16. Dublin: 
University College Dublin Press. 
Elias, Norbert. 2012 (1939). On the Process of Civilization: Sociogenetic and 
Psychogenetic Investigations, vol. 3. Dublin: University College Dublin Press. 
Elias, Norbert. 2013. Studies on the Germans: Power Struggles and the 
Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, vol. 11. 
Dublin: University College Dublin Press. 
Gregersen, Hans V. 1981. Slesvig og Holsten indtil 1830. Copenhagen: Politiken. 
Hall, John A., Ove Korsgaard, and Ove K. Pedersen, eds. 2015. Building the nation. 
N.F.S. Grundtvig and Danish National Identity. Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing. 
Hornemann Møller, Iver. 1992. Den danske velfærdsstats tilblivelse. Copenhagen: 
Samfundslitteratur. 
Hvidt, Kristian. 1990. Det folkelige gennembrud og dets mænd. Gyldendal og 
Politikens Danmarkshistorie, vol. 11. Copenhagen: Gyldendal/Politiken. 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  206 
Karup Pedersen, Ole. 1970. Udenrigsminister P. Munchs opfattelse af Danmarks 
stilling i international politik. Copenhagen: Copenhagens Universitets Institut for 
Samtidshistorie og Statskundskab, Gads Forlag. 
Kaspersen, Lars B. and Laila Otteson. 2001. Associationalism for 150 Years and 
Still Alive and Kicking: Some Reflections on Danish Civil Society. Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (1): 105-130. 
Kaspersen, Lars B. 2004. How Denmark became Democratic. The impact of 
warfare and military reforms. Acta Sociologica 47 (1): 71-89. 
Kaspersen, Lars B. 2006. The Formation of the Danish Welfare State: Decisions in 
the state of exception. In National Identity and Varieties of Capitalism, ed. John 
A. Hall, John Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen, 99-132. Montreal: Montreal 
McGill University Press.  
Kaspersen, Lars B. 2013. Denmark in the World. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels 
Publishers. 
Kaspersen, Lars B. and Norman Gabriel. 2008. The Importance of Survival Units 
for Norbert Elias’ Figurational Perspective. Sociological Review 56 (3): 370-87. 
Korsgaard, Ove. 2004. Kampen om Folket. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Korsgaard, Ove. 2015a. How Grundtvig Became a Nation Builder. In Building the 
nation. N.F.S. Grundtvig and Danish National Identity, eds. Hall, John A., Ove 
Korsgaard, and Ove K. Pedersen, 192-209, Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing 
Korsgaard, Ove. 2015b. Grundtvig’s Idea of a People’s High School and Its 
Historical Influence. In Building the nation. N.F.S. Grundtvig and Danish 
National Identity, eds. Hall, John A., Ove Korsgaard, and Ove K. Pedersen, 315-
330, Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing 
Munch, Peter. 1905. Det ny Aarhundrede. 2nd year, vol. 2, book 2. Copenhagen. 
Munch, Peter 1907. Det ny Aarhundrede. 4th year, vol. 2. Copenhagen. 
Munch, Peter. 1907-08. Det ny Aarhundrede. 5th year, vol. 2. Copenhagen. 
Philip, Kjeld. 1947. Staten og fattigdommen. Copenhagen: Jul. Gjellerups Forlag. 
Rasmussen, Erik. 1965. Danmarks historie. Velfærdsstaten på vej 1913-1939, vol. 
13. Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag. 
Rerup, Lorenz. 1989. Danmarks historie, vol. 6, Tiden 1864-1914. Copenhagen: 
Gyldendal. 
Skovgaard-Petersen, Vagn. 1985. Danmarks historie, vol. 5. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Tamm, Ditlev. 1996. Konseilspræsidenten. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Vigen, Anders. 1950. Rigsdagen og erhvervsorganisationerne. In Den Danske 
Rigsdag, Vol. III (Rigsdagen og folket). Udgivet af Statsministeriet og 
Rigsdagens Præsidium. Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz.  
Østergård, Uffe. 2015. The Nation as Event: The Dissolution of the Oldenburg 
Monarchy and Grundtvig’s Nationalism. In Building the nation. N.F.S. Grundtvig 
and Danish National Identity, eds. Hall, John A., Ove Korsgaard, and Ove K. 
Pedersen, 110-133. Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing. 
 
Historical Social Research 
Historische Sozialforschung 
All articles published in HSR Special Issue 45 (2020) 1: 
Emotion, Authority, and National Character. 
 
Helmut Kuzmics, Dieter Reicher & Jason Hughes 
State, Emotion, Authority, and National Habitus. State-Related Problems of Our Time and Methodological 
Discourses in SocioSlogy and Historical Sociology. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.7-41 
Behrouz Alikhani 
Processes of the State and Habitus Formation in Iran in the 19th and early 20th Centuries: The Socio- and 
Psychogenesis of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.42-64 
Onur Kınlı & İrem Özgören Kınlı  
Is Every Turk Born a Soldier? A Historical-Processual Analysis. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.65-86 
Gad Yair  
The Uncanny: How Cultural Trauma Trumps Reason in German Israeli Scientific Collaborations.  
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.87-102 
Nicolas Demertzis & Hara Stratoudaki 
Greek Nationalism as a Case of Political Religion: Rituals and Sentimentality. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.103-128 
Miklós Hadas  
The Culture of Distrust. On the Hungarian National Habitus. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.129-152 
Marta Bucholc  
Schengen and the Rosary: Catholic Religion and the Postcolonial Syndrome in Polish National Habitus. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.153-181 
Lars Bo Kaspersen  
The Creation of Modern Denmark – A Figurational Analysis. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.182-206 
Dieter Reicher  
Nationalistic German Gymnastic Movements and Modern Sports. Culture  
between Identity and Habitus. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.207-225 
Steven Loyal & Stephen Quilley  
State Formation, Habitus, and National Character: Elias, Bourdieu, Polanyi, and Gellner and the Case of  
Asylum Seekers in Ireland. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.226-261 
Michael Dunning & Jason Hughes  
Power, Habitus, and National Character: The Figurational Dynamics of Brexit. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.262-291 
Akira Ohira  
The Sociological Analysis of Ekiden, Japan’s Long-Distance Relay Road Race. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.292-308 
Stephen Mennell  
Power, Individualism, and Collective Self Perception in the USA. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.45.2020.1.309-329 
For further information on our journal, including tables of contents, article abstracts, 
and our extensive online archive, please visit https://www.gesis.org/en/hsr. 
 
ist ri l i l s r  
i t ri  i lf r  
